Written by: Gjergji Kajana for CeSPI
The original policy brief can be found in Italian here
ABSTRACT
The reconstruction of Ukraine in a future post-war phase represents an opportunity for Croatia and six non-EU countries in the Western Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia) to strengthen their ties with Kiev and Brussels, upgrading their country systems in the field of development cooperation. This paper analyzes the involvement of the seven Balkan states in the Ukrainian recovery process and explores the potential of such cooperation in the areas of entrepreneurship, energy, demining, local reconstruction, civil society, and reforms to be carried out in the EU accession process.
Ukraine’s reconstruction plans
According to the latest UNHCR data, the conflict in Ukraine since February 2022 has displaced 5.75 million residents[1] outside the country’s borders and, according to the World Bank, has increased the number of Ukrainian citizens living in poverty by 7.1 million[2] in 2022.
The assessment report developed jointly by the UN, the World Bank, the European Commission, and the Ukrainian government and published on February 25, 2025, estimates that the cost of rebuilding the Eastern European country will be approximately $524 billion over the next decade, which is 2.8 times Ukraine’s estimated gross domestic product for 2024.[3] Among the sectors most in need of funding are housing ($84 billion), transport, energy, trade, industry, and agriculture. Seventy-two percent of the total damage is in the Ukrainian regions close to the war front: Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Kyiv.
Two main instruments of external support for the country have been in place since the beginning of the conflict:
- The Donors’ Platform for Ukraine between Kyiv, the G7, the EU, and international financial institutions, which provides financial support focused primarily on Ukraine’s immediate current expenditure needs;
- The Ukraine Facility 2024–2027 program, funded by the European Union and providing €50 billion in grants and loans to Kyiv, aims to support the country in the internal reforms necessary to prepare Ukraine for EU membership. Accession negotiations were formally launched on June 25, 2024. Four annual editions of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) have been organized since 2022 to foster a partnership of high-level international political and economic operators with the capacity to work on the future reconstruction of Ukraine. With the aim of involving the private sector, the Ukraine Business Compact platform has been created, where companies interested in being involved in the future reconstruction process can register. At the programmatic level, the 2024 URC in Berlin outlined four dimensions of reconstruction: economic, to encourage investment; local, to enhance the output of assistance at the regional and municipal levels; mobilization of human resources, starting with the reintegration of displaced persons and war veterans into civilian life; European, to pair post-war restructuring with Kiev’s alignment with the criteria required for EU membership.
The Western Balkans – Ukraine relationship
Both Croatia and the WB6[4] have increased their interactions with Kiev since 2022. With the exception of Belgrade, all of the countries mentioned above have joined the EU sanctions packages against Russia, while all seven states have participated in various editions of the URC. Since 2023, four high-level summits (in Athens, Tirana, Dubrovnik, and Odessa) have been held between Ukraine and the countries of Southeast Europe. In the joint final declarations of the summits, Kiev’s southeastern partners took a stand condemning Russian aggression, supporting Ukraine’s path to EU membership, committing to the post-war reconstruction of the country, and supporting the “independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders” of the attacked country, specifying that ‘the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, and the regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia are an integral part of Ukraine’.[5] The joint final declaration of the Odessa summit defined military and energy security, hybrid threats, demining, and humanitarian aid as priority areas for cooperation between Ukraine and the southeastern countries. Serbia has signed all the joint final declarations of the summits except that of Odessa.[6]
However, Kiev’s political relations with Serbia and Kosovo are complicated.[7] Belgrade adheres to a multi-vector geopolitical position that distances it from unconditional support for Ukraine due to its high-level relations with Russia and Hungary.[8] Nevertheless, neither capital recognizes de jure the material change that has taken place at their borders in recent decades: Belgrade considers all parts of Ukrainian territory occupied by Moscow since 2014 to be subject to Kiev’s sovereignty, while Ukraine does not recognize Kosovo’s independence from Serbia, proclaimed in 2008.
Economically, however, relations between Ukraine and the seven countries under review are intensifying. According to data from the UN global trade platform[9], in 2024 Kiev’s trade with Serbia, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina reached approximately $615 million. Within these countries, most of the trade is with Belgrade ($300.59 million) and Zagreb ($187.1 million). With North Macedonia, Ukrainian trade reached $74.3 million[10] in 2023 and was accelerated by a bilateral agreement to liberalize cargo transport between the two countries. Ukraine has free trade agreements in place with Serbia, North Macedonia, and Montenegro. Kiev’s trade relations with Croatia are governed by the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)[11], which came into force in 2014 and was updated on October 28, 2025. The new text liberalizes trade in dairy products between the EU and Kiev. The increase in Ukrainian goods with facilitated access to the single market is subject to Ukraine’s gradual alignment with EU production standards.
The outbreak of the conflict has pushed for increased cooperation in the security sector, which has materialized through the signing of bilateral agreements in this area by Kiev with Croatia[12] and Albania[13], while another is being negotiated with Montenegro[14].
Reconstruction and Transnational Empowerment
The reconstruction process in Ukraine could offer the seven countries under consideration the opportunity to participate in all phases of post-war social consolidation. These phases consist of humanitarian aid, socio-material and economic reconstruction, and state consolidation through the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession. Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo can contribute their experience in organizing elections in post-conflict contexts to post-war Ukraine. In order to better define the contours of their sectoral involvement in the recovery, each of the seven countries could adopt a national program containing guidelines for their role in this process. An example to follow in this regard is Lithuania, which has already published a document[15] setting out the Baltic republic’s objectives, priority areas for action, and operating procedures for Ukrainian reconstruction for the period 2024-2027.
Croatia could play a leading role in contributing to Ukraine’s recovery. Its EU membership status makes Zagreb a full participant in EU assistance mechanisms: the EU Anti-Corruption Initiative (EUACI)[16] in the fight against corruption in Ukraine; the Initiative for Ukraine launched in 2023 by the European Investment Bank[17]; the International Coalition for Science, Research and Innovation in Ukraine[18]; the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (MUPC) – which also includes Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. At the bilateral level, Zagreb can also contribute thanks to its experience as a provider of development cooperation in various crisis theaters, including Afghanistan with health and economic improvement projects in 2007-2013[19] and Colombia with education and demining projects since 2009.[20]
Particular attention is also being paid to the energy reconstruction of Kiev. To date, assistance has taken the form of supplies of generators and energy equipment, such as those operated by the Croatian group Končar in the Ukrainian nuclear energy sector.[21] The exchange in this regard would be mutable: while the seven countries in question can provide expertise on the first steps they themselves are taking in implementing sustainable energy strategies, Ukrainian experts can provide their expertise on restoring energy networks in critical conditions.
Assistance in the energy sector in Kiev has strategic value: Ukraine has vast reserves of natural gas[22], the better exploitation of which could help the EU and the Balkans diversify their energy supply. At present, Russia has a prominent position in gas supplies to Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia in the Balkan Peninsula, but its importance is declining thanks to a long-term dynamic that began in 2014 with the abandonment of the South Stream project—aimed at launching a new gas pipeline between Moscow and the EU—and accelerated by the Ukrainian conflict. Belgrade is diversifying its supplies by linking up with Azerbaijan and using the recent interconnection with Bulgaria, financed by Brussels.
A necessary step in transnational cooperation in this area remains the transition to green energy, agreed with Brussels as a condition for the release of EU funds from the Ukraine Facility 2024–2027 and by the WB6 in 2020 within the cooperative framework of the Berlin Process.[23]
Within the latter mechanism, in order to boost the exchange of sectoral expertise, consideration could be given to including Ukrainian civil society activists as observers in the Forum on Civil Society and Think Tanks of the Process, bearing in mind that the BUCN (Balkans-Ukraine Cooperation Network), which brings together NGOs from Ukraine and the WB6, has been operating since 2022.[24] The Forum’s core business is to recommend sectoral policies – including environment, energy, and decarbonization – to policy makers in order to speed up the integration of the WB6 into the EU, a goal that the Western Balkans share with Kiev.
Mine clearance is a crucial part of reconstruction. The latest UN[25] estimates state that approximately 139,000 km² of Ukrainian territory is littered with mines or other types of unexploded ordnance . Kiev has already begun cooperating with its partners Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo in this field. Bosnian engineers are working on demining in Ukraine as part of the Norwegian People’s Aid humanitarian organization. Approximately 100 Ukrainian military personnel have been trained in mine clearance at the specialized Mine Action & Training (MAT) facility in Peja, Kosovo. With additional international assistance, the three Balkan countries[26] can support the demining process in Ukraine by establishing these specialized facilities there during reconstruction. Without the success of this process, it will be impossible to plan for the industrial and agricultural reconstruction of the country in its post-war phase.
Experts in the field of criminal investigation from Ukraine and the seven countries can also cooperate in the area of transitional justice[27], the field of recovery that seeks to shed light on violations perpetrated during the conflict phase or the persistence of repressive regimes in the territory. In 2024, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia signed a political declaration[28] supporting the implementation of transitional justice in relation to the Ukrainian conflict at the end of the ministerial conference “Restoring Justice for Ukraine” co-organized in The Hague by the EU Commission, the Netherlands, and Kiev.[29]
Reconstruction also offers business opportunities in Ukraine, which has been hit by the negative effects on economic productivity resulting from the demographic decline caused by the large diaspora that has developed since 2022. One way to increase productivity is to attract high-quality foreign direct investment (FDI). In pursuing FDI inflows in wartime conditions, Kiev has launched the uResidency program, based on an Estonian model. Through this scheme, non-resident foreign citizens of India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Slovenia can obtain a digital entrepreneurial identity in the country and operate there in the information technology and creative industries. Opening up the system to other countries contains the seeds of greater economic diversification, potentially benefiting Kiev or its partner countries, such as those in the Balkans.
Other opportunities for economic upgrading are contained in the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR). This is a macro-regional program financed by EU funds with the aim of improving cooperation between the countries of the Danube basin in eleven sectors, including transport, energy, education, and competitiveness. Fourteen countries are participating, nine of which are EU members (Germany, Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) and five non-EU members (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Moldova, and Ukraine with the oblasts of Transcarpathia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, and Odessa). Conducted by researchers Hanzl-Weiss and Jovanović, a study published in 2022[30] observing 17 economies in Central and Eastern Europe (including those of the countries analyzed in this text) demonstrates the high impact on economic growth and poverty reduction of FDI from Germany and Austria. These positive effects, facilitated by geographical proximity to Germanic countries and the increasing integration of the East with Western value chains, are a signal to the Balkans and Kiev of the potential inherent in accelerating contacts within the EUSDR. The countries participating in the Strategy could localize their FDI needs by sector through the establishment of investment promotion agencies or by strengthening existing ones based on the CzechInvest model[31], which aims to transform Prague into a leader in economic innovation in Europe.
Also worth mentioning is the increased infrastructural connection with Kiev within the trans-European transport networks (TEN-T). The Rhine-Danube corridor will connect Ukraine, Serbia, and Croatia, while the Mediterranean corridor will start in Spain, pass through Croatia in Rijeka and Zagreb, and end in Lviv. The WBEM (Western Balkans – Eastern Mediterranean) corridor will connect Austria with Cyprus, passing through all the capitals of the Balkan countries analyzed, and will be linked to the Aegean-Black Sea-Baltic TENT-T corridor that passes through Ukraine.
On an economic level, the respective chambers of commerce are working together to strengthen business ties between the parties. The Serbian Chamber of Commerce and Industry has signed[32] a memorandum of cooperation on reconstruction with its counterpart in Kiev. Business forums have been organized between Kiev and representatives of companies from Serbia and Montenegro. According to data provided by the Embassy of Tirana in Ukraine at the end of 2024, 63 companies owned by Ukrainian citizens operate in the Balkan country, with 43% of them based in the maritime prefecture of Vlora[33], an important economic and infrastructural center in southern Albania. The Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry has appointed representatives in the Balkan countries in an attempt to raise the level of economic cooperation with the states in the area.[34]
In terms of pursuing reforms to join the EU, Ukraine can draw on the experience of Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia. In the field of digital public services for citizens, there are opportunities for Ukraine and Albania to exchange experiences, with Tirana introducing the eAlbania platform in an effort to reduce corruption in public administration and Kiev introducing the ProZorro platform for public procurement. For Kiev, combating corrupt practices remains a critical issue in the application of the Copenhagen criteria, with Croatia and Albania – which have undertaken a thorough reform of their judicial systems to bring them into line with EU standards – offering valuable expertise in this area.
Furthermore, the WB6 and Croatia are active in the local reconstruction of Ukraine, mainly through the provision of humanitarian aid.[35] Various twinning arrangements with Ukrainian cities have been established.[36] There is potential for support in mobilizing emergency know-how and logistical support from the Balkans to Ukraine through the B40 Cities network of trans-Balkan local authorities. Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia have declared their commitment to participate in the reconstruction of the city of Irpin[37], while Serbia has offered to contribute to the reconstruction of Ukrainian regions affected by the war.[38]
In 2023, the European city organization EUROCITIES conducted an exchange of practices[39] between 34 municipalities in Europe and 11 counterpart entities in Ukraine on the effective reconstruction of destroyed local areas based on the “Building Back Better”[40] approach, which aims to achieve more resilient reconstruction following damage. Among the model projects presented to their Ukrainian counterparts is one on seismic risk mitigation implemented in Zagreb on 320,000 buildings, which consists of entering their main characteristics into an online platform with the main purpose of establishing criteria for their resilient reconstruction in case improvements need to be made.
At the government level, as an EU member, Croatia is in a position to propose the establishment of an INTERREG EU funding project aimed at assisting Ukrainian municipalities with the budgetary needs related to reconstruction. Such a plan could strengthen cooperation between local authorities in Kiev and Brussels, already operational in 24 Ukrainian regions through the European Commission’s U-LEAD with Europe program, which offers local authorities logistical support for reconstruction and legislative know-how in adapting to EU criteria.
Conclusion
The decision to engage in the reconstruction of Ukraine has strategic significance: for NATO members Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia, this path is a necessity given the implications of the conflict for Euro-Atlantic collective security, in which they are involved; for Serbia, it is an opportunity to move closer to European Union policies and reaffirm its economic interests, given the growing importance of its economic ties with Kiev; for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, it is a favorable circumstance to approach international dossiers from which they are often excluded due to their peripheral diplomatic projection. At the same time, this relationship offers Kiev and the WB6 the opportunity to assist each other in strengthening their state systems to meet the criteria required by the common goal of joining the European Union, while providing Croatia with an assist in proposing itself as a facilitator of this process by acting from within the Brussels institutions.
[1] Fonte: https://www.unhcr.org/emergencies/ukraine-emergency.
L’UNHCR (Alto Commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i Rifugiati) afferma esplicitamente: “A settembre 2025 5.75 milioni di rifugiati dall’Ucraina si segnalano a livello globale (di cui 5.2 milioni in Europa), mentre 3.75 milioni di persone sono sfollati interni”.
[2] Fonte: https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2023/11/30/the-world-bank-and-ukraine-laying-the-groundwork-for-reconstruction-in-the-midst-of-war.
La Banca Mondiale afferma esplicitamente: “La proporzione di ucraini che vivono in condizioni di povertà è aumentata dal 5.5% al 24.1% nel 2022, spingendo dentro queste condizioni altri 7.1 milioni di persone e rovesciando 15 anni di sviluppo economico”.
[3] Il rapporto: https://ukraine.un.org/en/290001-fourth-rapid-damage-and-needs-assessment-rdna4-february-2022-december-2024.
[4] Definizione usata per racchiudere i sei paesi dei Balcani Occidentali che non sono membri dell’Unione Europea: Serbia, Bosnia-Erzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia del Nord.
[5] Tutte queste entità sono state dichiarate da Mosca come parte del territorio nazionale della Federazione Russa.
Testo della dichiarazione finale del summit di Dubrovnik: https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/Vijesti/2024/Listopad/9_listopada/Dubrovnik_Summit_Declaration.pdf.
[6] Testo della dichiarazione finale del summit di Odessa: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/deklaraciya-chetvertogo-samitu-ukrayina-pivdenno-shidna-yevr-98389.
[7] Per un analisi descrittiva: Shymkevich, K., 2023 – https://bezbednost.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/prijateljstvo-ENG-02-1.pdf.
[8] Budapest rappresenta il membro UE più critico verso le posizioni di Bruxelles di condanna senza riserve dell’aggressione russa e della politica di avvicinamento di Kiev all’adesione nelle istituzioni comunitarie.
[9] Fonte principale: https://comtradeplus.un.org/.
[10] Fonte dall’Observatory of Economic Complexity: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/ukr/partner/mkd.
[11] Sul DCFTA: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/ip_25_2543.
[12] Testo: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ugoda-pro-dovgostrokove-spivrobitnictvo-ta-pidtrimku-mizh-uk-93733.
[13] Testo: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ugoda-pro-dovgostrokove-spivrobitnictvo-ta-pidtrimku-mizh-uk-95573.
[14] Fonte: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-ta-chornogoriya-proveli-chergovij-raund-peregovoriv-96405.
[15] I principi guida di Vilnius: https://tr.mfa.lt/storage/tr/public/uploads/2024/11/ukraine-guidelines-en-paskutine.pdf.
[16] L’EUACI costituisce un piano dell’UE avviato nel 2017. Sito ufficiale: https://euaci.eu/en/.
[17] Nel Fondo per l’Ucraina – che è parte costituente dell’Iniziativa – la Croazia ha contribuito con 1 milione d’euro.
[18] L’iniziativa nasce dalla collaborazione tra il Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca italiano, il Ministero dell’Istruzione e della Scienza ucraino, l’UNESCO e la Commissione Europea: https://www.mur.gov.it/it/news/venerdi-11072025/ucraina-nasce-la-coalizione-la-scienza-la-ricerca-e-linnovazione.
[19] Fonte dal Ministero degli Affari Esteri ed Europei della Repubblica di Croazia: https://www.karaman-design.com/images/print/Partnerstvo_web.pdf.
[20] Fonte: https://southsouth-galaxy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Croatia-A-Unique-Bridge-between-North-and-South-Development-Cooperation-2018.pdf.
[21] Fonte: https://seenews.com/news/koncar-delivers-transformers-for-ukraines-nuclear-energy-sector-1283428.
[22] Profilo energetico dell’Ucraina: https://www.iea.org/reports/ukraine-energy-profile/energy-security.
[23] Il Processo costituisce un meccanismo di cooperazione regionale incentrato principalmente su infrastrutture e società civile. Fanno parte i WB6 e vari membri UE. Nel 2020 i leader dei WB6 concordarono l’impegno congiunto di raggiungere le zero emissioni nette entro il 2050.
[24] Fonte sulla creazione del network BUCN: https://www.newgeopolitics.org/2022/10/06/balkans-ukraine-cooperation-network-was-founded/.
[25] Fonte: https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164121.
[26] Malgrado il forte legame storico con il mondo mitteleuropeo e occidentale (accentuato dall’appartenenza dei croati alla religione cattolica), sopratutto a causa della sua collocazione geografica consideriamo la Croazia come parte dei paesi che costituiscono la Penisola Balcanica.
[27] Definizione del concetto di transitional justice: https://www.dirittoconsenso.it/2021/12/17/la-transitional-justice/.
[28] Testo: https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/documents/diplomatic-statements/2024/04/02/political-declaration-of-the-ministerial-restoring-justice-for-ukraine-conference.
[29] Fonte: https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/european-commission-co-hosts-international-conference-on-restoring-justice-for-ukraine-in-the-hague/.
[30] Testo dello studio: https://wiiw.ac.at/economic-and-social-impacts-of-fdi-in-central-east-and-southeast-europe-dlp-6407.pdf.
[31] Sito ufficiale: https://czechinvest.gov.cz/en/About-CzechInvest/About-Us.
[32] https://en.pks.rs/news/the-economy-of-serbia-is-ready-to-help-the-reconstruction-of-ukraine.
[33] Fonte: https://ambasadat.gov.al/ukraine/en/newsroom/marredheniet-dypaleshe/.
[34] Lista dei rappresentanti: https://ucci.org.ua/en/advocacy/delegation-of-the-ucci-abroad.
[35] Da Croazia: https://myukraineis.org/news/40_tons_of_humanitarian_aid_sent_from_croatia_to_ukraine_with_the_support_of_favbet_foundation-1128.html.
Da Albania: https://www.coe.int/en/web/programmes/-/albania-funds-council-of-europe-action-plan-for-ukraine-1.
[36] Un esempio è quello di Kriva Palanka della Macedonia del Nord con Perechyn, della capitale albanese Tirana con Kharkiv o tra Berat in Albania e Khotyn: https://tvklan.al/rindertimi-berati-binjakezim-me-khotynin-ne-ukraine.
[37] Fonte: https://euronews.al/en/minister-xhacka-on-ukraine-recovery-conference-we-will-rebuild-irpin/.
[38] Dichiarazione citata del Presidente della Serbia Aleksandar Vučić: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/06/11/7516702/.
[39] Contenuti e risultati: https://monitor.eurocities.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Eurocities_Toolkit_Ukraine_final.pdf.
[40] Esposizione del concetto:
https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/Disaster%20Recovery%20Guidance%20Series-%20Building%20Back%20Better%20in%20Post-Disaster%20Recovery.pdf.
