Kosovo has held parliamentary national elections last Sunday, the 7th of June, five months after the previous round in December 2025. These elections mark the third time Kosovan voters head to the polls within 16 months, signifying the depth of the political permacrisis the country finds itself in. Sunday’s elections became unavoidable after parliament failed to elect a new president in April, when the term of outgoing President Vjosa Osmani ended.
Election background
Kosovo is in a state of political stagnation ever since the February 2025 elections, where Vetëvendosje leader and incumbent Prime Minister Albin Kurti won the elections, but lost the absolute majority of seats in parliament necessary to form a government. Between February and December 2025, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the largest opposition parties, prevented any formation of a government led by Kurti – leading to renewed snap elections in December 2025.
As Donika Emini wrote on our website back then, that deadlock appeared to have been resolved in December, when the PDK and LDK were punished by Kosovar voters; where they were still perceived as viable alternative governing forces by February, they were held responsible for the ensuing paralysis in December, and Vetëvendosje regained its absolute majority with 57 seats in the 120-member parliament.
The result was seen as a political turning point and an opportunity for institutional stabilisation, but the opposite happened: the crisis deepened. The problem was no longer the absence of a mandate to govern – Vetëvendosje had that. It was the ‘inability to translate it into functional governing structures’, thanks to a fallout between Kurti and Vjosa Osmani, who formed an alliance prior to the 2021 elections. During the Kurti governing period, disagreements unravelled over foreign policy; when the moment came for Kurti to support Osmani for a second Presidential term, he declined.
To elect a President in parliament, 80 of the 120 members have to agree on a candidate – and Vetëvendosje lacked the votes on their own. Its inability to reach a compromise and consensus with opposition parties meant a new government with a new President could not be formed – and the deadlock sustained, up until the end of Osmani’s term in April, prompting last Sunday’s snap elections.
Turnout and results
The political permacrisis seemed to have instigated some voter fatigue, as the turnout dropped to 37% – a 10 percentage point drop compared to last December.
With 97.8% percent of the ballots counted, not including conditional ballots, international diaspora ballots and those of people with special needs, Vetëvendosje won 43% of the votes – dropping 8 percentage points compared to December, and more consequential, losing its majority in parliament. Kurti’s party is still well ahead of its main rivals – the PDK and LDK won 21% and 17.6% respectively.
As Vetëvendosje maintained its status as biggest party in the country, its support shrank and that of the opposition grew – but the low turnout was the main concern among members of the opposition, with the PDK’s secretary general blaming Kurti for causing ‘big disappointment’ among the population.
Future expectations
The result of this Sunday is, on paper, a return to the same impasse that followed the February 2025 elections – no party capable of governing on its own, with political tensions and rivalries unresolved.
The most significant development in the opposition is the return of Vjosa Osmani into the LDK, with whom she broke in 2021; they campaigned together for these elections to recreate the 2021 Vetëvendosje dynamic, when Osmani aligned with Kurti. Her return to the LDK is complex: she has aligned herself with Vetëvendosje during her term as President, which makes her appear opportunistic.
Prior to the elections, the opposition’s realistic objective was to reduce Vetëvendosje below 50% to break the parliamentary majority and make coalition-making viable. They have achieved that, but the question remains whether the impasse can be ruptured this time around. There are no clear signs relationships between Vetëvendosje and either PDK or LDK are improving this time around – with Osmani’s realignment complicating the matter.
For a breakthrough, a significant change in political culture is necessary, where power sharing and compromise are not interpreted as signs of weaknesses but as conditions for functional governance. Otherwise, the cycle of stagnation is likely to continue.
For more information and insights, read the in-depth analysis of Donika Emini prior to the elections on our website here.
