Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the use of drones has increased explosively. While unmanned aerial vehicles were initially deployed mainly for reconnaissance, they have since become indispensable for attacks, artillery targeting and electronic warfare. Especially over the past year, the number of drones used has risen sharply, with profound consequences for the course of the war.
For many Ukrainians, the buzzing sound of a drone does not signify technological progress but immediate danger. Drones have become a core component of modern warfare: relatively cheap to produce, scalable in large numbers, and heavily dependent on international supply chains. Russia deploys different types of drones for different purposes. Iranian-designed Shahed drones (renamed Geran-2 by Russia) are frequently used to strike civilian infrastructure, while lighter drones such as the Gerbera – largely made from inexpensive materials – are primarily used to deceive and overwhelm air-defence systems.
Although both Ukraine and Russia produce drones on a large scale, Russia possesses a far greater industrial capacity. What makes this war particularly troubling is that much of the critical technology found in Russian drones does not originate in Russia itself. Research into downed drones shows that microchips, cameras and other electronic components often come from Western countries, including the Netherlands.
These components are rarely exported directly to Russia. Instead, they reach their destination through distributors and intermediary countries, often via complex trade routes in which Chinese transit plays a significant role. As a result, the war in Ukraine is not only fought on the battlefield, but also embedded in global trade networks. This raises an uncomfortable question: how can Dutch technology, intended for civilian use, ultimately end up in weapons deployed against a democratic society?
A web of sanctions and circumvention
Since the invasion, the European Union has imposed the most extensive sanctions package in its history. These measures not only restrict trade with Russian companies, but also introduce far-reaching export controls on so-called dual-use goods: products that can be used for both civilian and military purposes.
Over the course of the war, sanctions have been repeatedly tightened. They include transport and transit restrictions, a ban on diamond trade, measures targeting Russia’s “shadow fleet” involved in oil exports, and severe financial sanctions. With the eleventh sanctions package (June 2023), the EU explicitly focused for the first time on combating circumvention through third countries.
In 2024, a fourteenth package followed, including a ban on LNG transshipment and further restrictions on Russia’s access to international payment systems. In early 2025, member states reached agreement on a sixteenth package, targeting, among other things, aluminium, vessels in the shadow fleet, and additional export restrictions on critical technologies.
The European Commission also publishes guidelines to help companies identify risks. A key instrument is the so-called High Priority Items list, which includes goods particularly susceptible to military misuse, such as integrated circuits, radio-frequency components and navigation technologies.
Despite these efforts, enforcement remains complex. In the Netherlands, some concrete steps have been taken in recent years: in early 2024, three individuals were arrested on suspicion of sanctions circumvention involving the export of potentially military-relevant technology, followed in 2025 by new investigations into companies supplying computer hardware to Russia via indirect routes. At the same time, international supply chains are long, transit countries do not always cooperate fully, and many electronic components are freely available worldwide.
This creates a painful contrast. While Europe invests billions in air defence and protection against Russian drones, some components of those very weapons originate from European factories. The Netherlands has actively supported Ukraine since 2024 with air-defence and counter-drone systems, even as authorities investigate how Dutch technology continues to reach Russian weapons through indirect channels.
Responsibility across the supply chain
The central question is not primarily whether Dutch companies knowingly violate sanctions, but whether their products nonetheless contribute – via indirect routes – to Russian military operations. The discovery of recently manufactured Dutch chips in Russian drones underscores that responsibility does not end at the factory gate, but extends across the entire supply chain: from manufacturers to distributors and resellers.
The European Commission emphasises companies’ duty of care. Guidelines stress the importance of customer due diligence, heightened vigilance when exporting to high-risk countries, and additional controls on sensitive products. In theory, these instruments are clear. In practice, compliance often remains limited to what is strictly required by law.
For this reason, Ukraine and its European partners call on companies to respect not only the letter but also the spirit of sanctions. This requires stricter internal controls, active monitoring of re-exports through distributors, and greater transparency in supply chains. Some companies have begun to adopt additional measures, such as contractual re-export bans or technical restrictions, but these remain the exception rather than the rule.
Values versus profit
Ultimately, this debate goes beyond trade and regulation. It touches on the values that the Netherlands and Europe claim to uphold. Solidarity with Ukraine entails not only military support, but also a critical examination of how our own economies function.
The paradox is clear: Europe builds air-defence systems to protect Ukraine from Russian drones, while European technology indirectly contributes to the production of those same weapons. As long as this tension persists, solidarity remains incomplete.
Vigilance is therefore essential. Governments can better support companies through knowledge-sharing and international cooperation, but responsibility cannot be fully outsourced to regulation alone. Every component that reaches Russian weapons through indirect routes symbolises a choice: between profit and values, between short-term gain and long-term responsibility.
The war in Ukraine shows that the struggle for freedom is fought not only on the battlefield, but also through trade routes, legislation and ethical decisions. If Europe truly seeks to defend the values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law, it must demonstrate that these values outweigh economic profit. Closing the loopholes in the sanctions regime is therefore not merely a technical exercise, but a normative imperative. Only then can Europe credibly claim that its technology contributes to peace rather than oppression.
What can be improved in practice?
That responsibility also demands concrete choices. Without additional measures, sanctions remain vulnerable to circumvention. Several steps are evident:
- Greater responsibility across the supply chain
Companies producing or trading sensitive technologies should not only scrutinise their direct customers, but also pay close attention to resale through intermediaries and third countries. This reduces the likelihood that components ultimately end up in Russian weapons. - Stricter rules for high-risk technologies
For electronic components frequently found in Russian drones, the EU could introduce stricter licensing requirements, particularly for exports to countries where sanctions circumvention is widespread. - Greater transparency on end-use
Companies could be required to provide clearer insight into who ultimately uses their products. This would enable more effective oversight without halting legitimate trade altogether. - Stronger cooperation in enforcement
Because sanctions circumvention is inherently cross-border, closer cooperation between European customs authorities and law-enforcement agencies is essential to identify suspicious trade routes more quickly. - Support for companies seeking to avoid risk
Governments can assist companies through clear guidance, risk intelligence and secure reporting mechanisms, ensuring that refusing suspicious orders does not result in a competitive disadvantage.
Written by Elene Amiranashvili
