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Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, international sanctions have aimed to curb the Kremlin’s access to oil revenues that finance its war. Yet investigative reporting continues to show that Russian oil exports have not stopped, they have adapted. A recent investigation by iFact sheds light on one such adaptation: the use of so-called shadow fleet vessels operating through Georgian ports.
This report should raise eyebrows in Brussels and in the EU member states. Not only have we gotten to the point where sanctions that are supposed to help support Ukraine and keep Europeans safe being circumvented, it is done by a candidate member state with a 85% pro-European population. By our passive response to Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream government illegally rigging the elections and maintain power, we have let a potential ally slip away. And we’re paying the price.
What the iFact Investigation Found
The investigation documents how gaps in maritime transparency and oversight allow sanctioned oil to move through Georgia and international supply chains with obscured origins, revealing broader weaknesses in the global sanction’s regime.
According to iFact, at least 19 oil tankers that meet commonly used shadow fleet criteria entered Georgian ports, including Batumi, Poti, and Kulevi, between 2024 and 2026. The term shadow fleet describes a network of oil tankers and maritime services that operate outside the normal regulatory and monitoring frameworks of international maritime trade. These vessels shared several recurring characteristics:
- Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals were disabled or manipulated during parts of their voyages, making it difficult to trace routes and cargo origins.
- The ships often changed flags, ownership structures, or registration details, complicating accountability and oversight.
- Many were older vessels operated by opaque companies registered in jurisdictions with limited transparency.
- Several tankers appeared to travel between Russian ports or occupied Ukrainian territories and Georgia, while masking parts of their journey.
These methods are widely associated with efforts to bypass sanctions and scrutiny, even when no single step is illegal in isolation.
Georgia as a Transit Point, Not an Exception
The investigation highlights Georgia’s role as a logistical transit hub, not as a unique case of sanctions circumvention. Georgian ports handle large volumes of oil and petroleum products and sit at a strategic crossroads between sanctioned producers and global markets.
What iFact’s reporting illustrates is how neutral or third-country ports can become part of sanction-evasion pathways when transparency mechanisms are weak or easily exploited. Oil that arrives with obscured shipping histories can later be re-exported or blended, making it harder for downstream buyers to determine origin.
The Broader Sanctions Loophole
The European Union, the United States, and other countries have imposed price caps and import bans to limit Russia’s ability to finance its war against Ukraine. The iFact investigation shows how these measures can be weakened in practice.
The investigation documents practices that expose several vulnerabilities in sanctions enforcement:
- Third-country transit dilutes sanctions.
When oil moves through intermediaries and logistical hubs such as Georgian ports, sanctions lose effectiveness even without formal violations.
- Obscured origins hinder enforcement.
Masked shipping routes, frequent changes in registration, and incomplete documentation make it difficult to distinguish sanctioned cargoes from compliant ones.
- Shadow fleet practices undermine transparency.
Manipulated tracking systems and opaque ownership structures erode the transparency sanctions enforcement depends on.
- Diffused responsibility weakens accountability.
As shipments pass through multiple jurisdictions, enforcement gaps emerge without any single actor clearly breaching sanctions.
The shadow fleet activity documented in Georgia thus reflects a systemic weakness in the global sanction’s regime, not a purely regional problem.
Why This Matters for Solidarity with Ukraine
Every barrel of Russian oil that reaches international markets represents continued revenue for a state waging an aggressive war against Ukraine. While sanctions remain one of the EU’s most important non-military tools of solidarity, their effectiveness depends on closing loopholes that allow sanctioned commodities to circulate under cover of technical compliance.
By documenting how shadow fleet vessels operate openly within the existing system, iFact’s investigation underscores a central lesson: sanctions are only as strong as the transparency mechanisms that support them.
For European policymakers, civil society, and pro-democracy actors, the findings are a reminder that solidarity with Ukraine requires not only political commitment, but sustained attention to the often-invisible logistical networks that keep Russia’s war economy afloat. In the current geopolitical turmoil, it’s up to the EU to support democratic leaders in its eastern neighbourhood. Our safety and the citizens of Ukraine, Georgia and others depend on it.
Written by Elene Amiranashvili
This article is based on the research done by iFact Georgia, read the full research here: https://ifact.ge/en/the-shadow-fleet-how-russian-oil-flows-through-georgian-ports/
More about sanction evasion, and how Western technology ends up in Russians drones: https://europeanforum.net/drones-sanctions-and-responsibility-how-dutch-technology-ends-up-in-russian-weapons/
