On October 3rd, Latvians cast their vote in the 15th Saeima elections, the national parliament of the Baltic state. Former prime minister Evika Siliņa resigned in May earlier this year following the political crisis caused by Ukrainian drones striking Latvian soil, diverted by Russian electronics. Latvia remained stable in the period coming up to the elections however, defying expectations of unrest and (successful) Russian interference after the fall of the government. This was not the first Russian destabilizing attempt that Latvia has faced, and they came prepared. How does Russian disinformation in Latvia look like and what can other EU member states learn from Latvia’s digital battle?
Historic elections
First, the election results. Current prime minister Andris (United List) has won the elections in a landslide victory, receiving 35% of all votes, a historic high never reached by any party since Latvia’s independence. When Silina resigned as PM, Kulbergs (United List) took up the reins. Since then, he has been very active on social media, profiling himself as a regular Latvian, who at the same time can act as a decisive leader.
Since Latvia uses a minimum 5% threshold for parties to enter parliament, United List will take up 41 seats in the Saeima, which has a total of one hundred seats. Kulbergs is known for his pro-Ukrainian and pro-EU stance, pitting him against populist parties such as Latvia First and Sovereign Power/Young Latvians, who came in 2nd and 3rd place after the United List, with 13% and 11,7% of the votes respectively.
Kulberg’s huge victory wasn’t the only historic aspect of the elections however, as voting turnout was the lowest ever in the history of Latvia’s democracy. Only 51,79% of eligible voters participated in the elections, with 806.641 citizens actually casting their vote. This follows a trend set since the first elections in 1993 after the independence, where 89,9% voted.
Security, economy and ties to Russia in campaign time
The campaign leading up to the elections focused on, unsurprisingly, security and defense issues, indicating the precarious international context Latvia finds itself in. The Baltic states are the eastern-most border of NATO, a position of high geopolitical importance, only elevated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Security wasn’t the only theme headlining the campaign however, as economic and social issues also found their way into key talking points.
Debates on security issues weren’t limited to defense investments or diplomacy talks, as personal ties between party leaders and Russia and Belarus were hot topics. During the campaign, Riga-based online news website ‘The Insider’ discovered that Jūlija Stepaņenko, leader of the ‘Sovereign Power/Young Latvians’, has dubious family ties. Stepanenko’s father, Sergei Fedotov, owns the majority share of two Russian family businesses, which can directly be linked to military equipment used in the Donbas and Belgorod region. Fedotov reportedly met with Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, who argued for bureaucratic obstacles to be removed in Russia, which is “sometimes in a hybrid war, sometimes in an open war”. Other parties requested investigations into Stepanenko.
Party leader Aleksejs Rosļikovs from For Stability!, who resides in Belarus, also participated in the elections. Rosļikovs fled to Belarus as he was accused of inciting national and ethnic hatred. Now being on Riga’s wanted list, he still lives in Minsk where he frames himself as a martyr, claiming that he and his family are threatened in Latvia. From Belarus, he aims to undermine the Latvian government, comparing for example gas prices between Belarus and Latvia. For Stability did not pass the 5% threshold.
‘People’s Power Force’, a registered political party but not electable during the parliament elections, organized a so-called ‘wise boycott’. They claim that elections with less than 50% turnout are illegitimate and call upon citizens to not use their vote. In their eyes, oligarchs and politicians have stolen the power from the people, and voting would only legitimize the regime. Their mission is to ‘preserve the population in Latvia’ and ‘stop the extinction of the Latvian nation’, demanding the cancellation of state funding for parties and calling for re-elections. According to the website, 43.692 people joined the boycott, of which 12.219 ‘non-citizens’ and 7.262 anonymously joined.
Narratives and frames
Common frames spread by Russian disinformation networks are focused on the EU or NATO. ‘These frames attempt to undermine the capability or legitimacy of these organizations’, Anete Bērzkalne tells in an interview with PRO International. Bērzkalne works at the Latvian Radio News Service as a disinformation expert and contributes to investigative journalism, specialized in Europe.
‘On the one hand, the EU would be too weak. On the other hand, the EU would be too focused on Brussels, leaving Latvia as a puppet state of the EU.’ NATO is put in a similar light: the transatlantic organization would either not be able to help Latvia or be too aggressive towards Russia. The Baltic states are often accused of the latter as well. Other narratives being spread say that Latvia’s decisions are silly, incompetent or idiotic.
Russia also targets specific audiences, namely the ethnic Russians living in Latvia. Russian speakers make up about 25% of the Latvian population, making it the biggest ethnic minority in the country. Russian sources claim that the Russian diaspora is being repressed. Over the last few years, Russian language in Latvian education has been declining, a trend Russia uses to reinforce their story. Similar to rhetoric used to legitimize the illegal invasion in Ukraine, the Kremlin is quick to use the term ‘nazi’s in their narratives about the supposed repression of Russians, Bērzkalne points out.
How does Russia spread disinformation?
On the 31st of July, Bērzkalne interviewed Jānis Sārts, the director of the Rīga-based NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (STRATCOMCOE). He talked on various hybrid attacks that Latvia could face during the elections, including malicious use of AI and drone- and cyber-attacks. His expectations weren’t misplaced, although state security services report that while cyber-attack activity was observed, it did not cause any consequences regarding the elections.
That isn’t for a lack of trying, however. For instance, two researchers monitored AI-responses regarding questions about the election, including what party the language models recommend. Depending on whether Latvian or Russian was used for the prompt, the responses and linked sources varied greatly. When asked in Russian, the AI-models (ChatGPT, Gemini and Claude) used compromised or even banned websites as sources, such as ‘Sputnik News’. The models also recommended different vote choices, favoring parties like ‘For Stability!’, ‘Sovereign Power’ and ‘Union of Young Latvians’. The last two, led by aforementioned Stepanenko, were mentioned twice as often compared to when the prompt was asked in Latvian.
Latvian television program ‘De Facto’ monitored pro-Kremlin media outlets and found that political candidates supporting Ukraine and sanctions against Russia were often ridiculed. On the other hand, candidates criticizing restrictions on Russian grain transits, for example, were favored. As one in three Latvian internet users make use of AI, manipulation of these models by flooding the network with Kremlin-favored content becomes increasingly interesting for Russia.
Social media provide key platforms for disinformation practices, mainly on TikTok and Telegram, Bērzkalne states. ‘Narratives first spread through other digital means can trickle down to social media platforms as well.’. The type of destabilization efforts depends on the platform, for example, Telegram is also used to recruit people for sabotage actions, whereas X shows more bot activity.
After the elections, Varis Teivāns, head of the Latvian cyber incident prevention institution, told Latvian Radio that cyber-attackers tried to create websites with similar domain names as popular Latvian news outlets, most likely for malicious purposes. They also tried to find loopholes in the digital environment, not just of election systems, but also the systems of local government and other state institutions. He acknowledged that more attacks were predicted but did not want to speculate on whether the high level of preparedness and investments deterred possible attackers.
Fighting back against digital warfare
Although it’s hard to say why the intensity of the attacks was less than expected, it’s clear that Latvia is fighting back. In January earlier this year, an inter-institutional group was formed to prevent security threats to the parliamentary elections, consisting of institutions concerned with election processes, state security services and cybersecurity for example. Furthermore, pro-Kremlin parties were monitored preventively, starting in 2025. On recommendation of the VDD (the State Security Service), 400 Russian propaganda websites have been blocked in Latvia since the invasion of Ukraine. In 2022, 80 Russian media outlets were similarly prohibited. Anti-disinformation campaigns were used to educate voters about their role in the elections, how they can recognize disinformation and not spread it themselves.
In her work, Anete Bērzkalne also tries to raise awareness about disinformation and how they operate. How malicious narratives and frames aim to create apathy, distrust and dissatisfaction: ‘the main goal is to dissuade people from voting or to encourage them to vote for parties that are more Russia-friendly’, she tells. ‘Everytime when we discover disinformation practices, it’s a judgement call. Do we tell the public and if so, how and when? The goal of the practices is often to spread fear, we don’t want to contribute to that.’ Drawing on an example from TikTok, which said that there would be a Russian election or referendum in January on the annexation of Latvia. ‘It was completely fake, but it looked very scary. So, I published it quite a time later’.
When asked about what other EU countries can learn from Latvia’s fight against Russian hybrid warfare, she underlined the importance of understanding how disinformation works and what the intent is behind spreading false narratives. ‘Narratives may seem contradictory but serve the same purpose: creating divisions between Latvians, between EU or NATO member states.’ She finishes: ‘We look at the impact of hybrid attacks, what the goals are. Fear or gathering intelligence, for example? Don’t underestimate the devious ways Russia operates.’
