Source: Sinistra in Europa
In recent weeks, people around the world have taken to the streets to protest in support of the rights and autonomy of the Kurdish population in northeastern Syria, known as Rojava. In cities such as London, Berlin, and Amsterdam, demonstrators filled squares and streets to call on the international community to stop the growing pressure from the Syrian regime and prevent autonomy from disappearing. But what exactly is happening in Rojava, and why have tensions between the Kurds and the Syrian state flared up again in recent weeks?
A fragile ceasefire
After an offensive operation in January and a fragile ceasefire, there seemed to be an opening for de-escalation in northeastern Syria in early 2026. On January 30th, an agreement was reached that should lead to a permanent ceasefire and the integration of Kurdish security forces and local administrative units into national institutions. On paper, this sounds like stabilization, but in practice, the agreement makes it painfully clear where the fault line really lies.
On the one hand, there is the interim authority in Damascus under President Ahmed al Sharaa, which wants to recentralize the state: one army, one security apparatus, and one hierarchy for legislation and administration. Damascus demands that the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which have de facto military control over Rojava, together with the regional administrations, be fully integrated into state institutions. This is a classic strategy of state-building after years of civil war.
On the other hand, there is the Rojava project, formally known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), with a political model that focuses on decentralization and local government. This model, known as the Social Contract, emphasizes multilingualism, gender equality, local councils and communes, and a democratic philosophy that deviates from the centralized model favored by Damascus.
Two visions of unity and democracy
For Damascus, national unity primarily means institutional uniformity and sovereign authority from the capital. Autonomy can exist, but only within strict frameworks that are subordinate to the central state. For the Kurdish movement in Rojava, autonomy is about an alternative democratic architecture: legitimacy is built from the bottom up through local councils, communes, and confederal structures. This ideological core of Rojava is strongly influenced by the ideas of Abdullah Öcalan, who describes “democratic confederalism” as a model in which society organizes itself from the bottom up, with an emphasis on direct participation, feminism, and self-government.
These contradictions between Damascus and Rojava are not just abstract ideological differences but touch on concrete interests: who controls oil revenues, who controls the borders, what security chains exist, and how is legislation made in a united Syria?
Identity, citizenship, and the place of minorities
A second source of friction is identity politics and citizenship. The administration in Rojava is emphatically multi-ethnic and multilingual: Kurdish, Arabic, and Syrian/Aramaic are official languages, and cultural rights are seen as central to the political project. Because these rights are vulnerable in a context where the central government does not automatically recognize them, Rojava also uses their protection as a political tool in negotiations with Damascus.
But there is also a downside: in some Arab areas, there is resentment against the SDF administration. Residents complain about discrimination, detention practices, and poor management of local resources. This local discontent makes it clear that the conflict is not only an ideological discussion about what is just, but also a struggle over which administration can prove more credible and effective.
Security challenges: the aftermath of ISIS
There is considerable pressure to create a single, unified security structure, partly because of the legacy of the fight against the Islamic State. Detention camps and prisons in the northeast were for years an important argument for international support for the SDF and their special status. The recent chaos surrounding prisons and breakouts during fighting, in which hundreds of prisoners temporarily escaped and security services lost control, shows how explosive this issue remains. At the same time, Damascus has announced plans to close camps such as al-Hol and Roj, reinforcing their claim that it is “restoring order and normality.”
For Rojava, this is precisely the ideological core of the conflict: their autonomous security structures are not only a means of defense, but a fundamental part of their political model. Full integration into a national security apparatus would, in practice, largely dismantle the confederal system of self-government. According to the International Crisis Group, the January 30 agreement does offer a path to de-escalation, but the main problems remain: unclear command structures, local powers, and deep-rooted mistrust do not simply disappear with a signature.
The role of Türkiye, the US, and Russia
The conflict is exacerbated by the role of foreign players. Turkey, for example, strongly opposes any form of Kurdish autonomy close to its border, as it views the Kurdish resistance movement within its own borders as a security threat. Ankara has repeatedly threatened military action against the YPG, the main fighting force of the SDF, and is putting pressure on Damascus to limit Kurdish self-government structures.
The United States also remains an important factor through its cooperation with the SDF in the fight against IS. Washington uses these ties to support stability and security in the northeast, but its involvement is selective and dependent on broader strategic priorities in the region. Russia, on the other hand, is primarily seeking to strengthen its position in a rebuilt Syria. By positioning itself as a mediator between Damascus and Rojava, and by making agreements on military bases and influence in the region, Moscow is attempting to consolidate its strategic grip. At the same time, this mediating role gives Damascus extra weight in negotiations, putting pressure on Rojava to make concessions.
What does the future hold for Syria?
What is at stake now in Rojava and more broadly in Syria is a choice between two visions of a future state: a centralized nation-state with uniform institutions, or a decentralized republic centered on local self-governance and pluralism. The agreement reached at the end of January may reduce the violence, but as long as the term “integration” means mainly absorption for Damascus in practice, and for Rojava mainly the end of their political project, the agreement will remain superficial and new tensions will be inevitable.