Source: Wikimedia Commons
On 25 October, the citizens of Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two entities that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), are expected to go to the polls in an unconstitutional referendum. The question they are asked is striking in its formulation:
“Do you accept the decisions of the unelected foreigner Christian Schmidt and the unconstitutional judgments of the BiH Court pronounced against the President of Republika Srpska, as well as the decision of the CEC to revoke the mandate of the President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik?”
The language leaves little doubt about the intended outcome. Yet behind the populist theatrics lies a deeper constitutional and political crisis. The referendum is the latest move in Milorad Dodik’s struggle to remain relevant after Bosnia’s state institutions stripped him of his mandate. While the referendum has no legal effect at the state level, its consequences for Bosnia’s fragile constitutional order, its European path, and regional stability could be significant.
The judicial verdict and CEC decision
The chain of events began in July 2023, when Dodik openly defied decrees issued by Bosnia’s international High Representative, Christian Schmidt. The High Representative holds extraordinary powers, known as the ‘Bonn Powers’, to enforce the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the Bosnian war in 1995. Dodik not only refused to implement Schmidt’s decisions but encouraged separatist steps by RS institutions.
In February 2025, Bosnia’s Court of First Instance sentenced Dodik to one year in prison, later converted into a fine, and imposed a six-year ban from public office. In August, the Appeals Chamber confirmed the verdict. The Central Election Commission (CEC) then implemented the ban by stripping Dodik of his mandate as RS President. This was a rare instance where state institutions held a powerful leader legally accountable.
The consequences should have been clear: Dodik could no longer serve as President, and RS should have organized early elections. Instead, the RS National Assembly rejected the state-level rulings, blocked the holding of early elections, and voted to hold a referendum on whether the decisions should be accepted. In other words, a judicial verdict and an administrative enforcement measure were transformed into a matter for popular vote.
The referendum as a bargaining tool
For Dodik, the referendum is not about giving citizens a say on judicial legitimacy. As Harun Cero, Program Manager for Democratisation and Security at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Sarajevo, explained, it is less a democratic exercise than “a bargaining issue”, a tool designed to extract concessions in exchange for calling it off. This reflects a long-standing pattern: Dodik pushes entity-level laws on RS intelligence, courts, or agencies, only to retreat when resistance grows.
The wording of the referendum itself illustrates the problem. By calling Schmidt an ‘unelected foreigner’ and Bosnia’s courts ‘unconstitutional’, it undermines the very architecture of post-Dayton governance. Direct democracy becomes not a means to strengthen legitimacy, but to hollow it out. International recognition of such a vote is unlikely. Only Russia and perhaps China might endorse it, while Dodik has already secured rhetorical support from Serbian President Vučić and Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán. Most other countries, as well as the EU, will denounce it as illegitimate. Yet Dodik does not need recognition abroad. His aim is to use the referendum as leverage: if it proceeds, he can claim popular legitimacy against Sarajevo; if it is cancelled in exchange for concessions, he can present himself as the defender of RS interests.
Elections and what comes next
This strategy also explains his efforts to block early presidential elections. After Dodik’s disqualification, the Central Election Commission scheduled the vote for later November 23rd of this year. These elections are crucial, they will determine not only his successor but also whether state-level rulings are enforced in practice. By refusing to organize them, RS authorities are suspending the core mechanism of democratic accountability and replacing it with a plebiscite on one man’s conviction. As Cero warned, “he will do everything to block the elections,” but his horizon is narrowing, “I don’t think he will last longer than the end of the year… there are too many things speaking currently against him.”
Much will depend on the interplay between Dodik, RS opposition figures, and international actors. Cero stressed the importance of the ‘shuttle diplomacy’ now underway, both within Bosnia and between Sarajevo’s partners abroad. Meanwhile, the Bosniak caucus in the RS Council of Peoples has launched a vital national interest procedure before the Constitutional Court, challenging both the referendum law and the decision to call the vote. The Court is expected to rule within a month, underscoring that Dodik’s strategy is contested even inside RS.
International stakes
For the international community, the stakes go beyond one leader. Allowing a convicted politician to overturn judicial decisions through plebiscitary politics would further erode Bosnia’s fragile rule of law. The OHR, already weakened by years of selective interventions, risks being delegitimized entirely. EU accession, formally opened for Bosnia in 2022, becomes harder to imagine if entity leaders can openly defy state institutions without consequence.
There are also immediate geopolitical dimensions. In November, the UN Security Council will decide on renewing the mandate of EUFOR/Althea, the international military mission in Bosnia. Russia has previously threatened to block it, and Dodik’s crisis offers Moscow another bargaining chip. Western actors must decide whether to let Dodik’s referendum pass as political theatre or to draw a firm line that state-level court decisions are not up for negotiation.
Conclusion
The referendum in Republika Srpska will not alter Dodik’s legal status: his conviction stands, and his ban from office remains in force. What it will do is provide him with a stage. By casting judicial rulings as illegitimate and by turning them into a matter of popular vote, Dodik presents himself as the defender of RS against external control. This may buy him time, but it also pushes Bosnia further into a cycle where legal decisions become political bargaining tools.
For Bosnia, the danger is not that Dodik overturns the court’s decision through this referendum – he cannot. The danger is that state institutions are steadily weakened each time their rulings are reframed as negotiable. For the EU and the US, the task is therefore not to debate the validity of the referendum, but to insist that court verdicts and electoral bodies remain beyond bargaining.
Dodik’s space is shrinking, and he is running out of time. Whether or not that prediction holds, the referendum reveals the logic of his politics. It is not about law, nor even about sovereignty. It is about survival through escalation. The question now is whether Bosnia’s partners will allow that logic to shape the country’s future or insist instead that the rules of the game are not up for negotiation.
For further background information on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina consult this article.
